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Abstract. In this paper we show how to capture dialogue games in Defeasible
Logic. We argue that Defeasible Logic is a natural candidate and general rep-
resentation formalism to capture dialogue games even with requirements more
complex than existing formalisms for this kind of games. We parse the dialogue
into defeasible rules with time of the dialogue as time of the rule. As the dialogue
evolves we allow an agent to upgrade the strength of unchallenged rules. The
proof procedures of [1] are used to determine the winner of a dialogue game.
1 Introduction
Agents interact with other agents. The nature of the interactions between two agents
can be of various kinds. Here we consider two types of interaction: cooperative and
adversarial. In a cooperative situation the agents exchange information with the aim of
reaching a common goal, while in an adversarial scenario the goals of the parties are
conflicting. However, this does not imply a clear-cut dissimilarity between the two types
of interaction. Conflicting sub-goals often are found amongst agents in a cooperative
setting, while all the same in an adversarial discussion one agent may partially accept a
proposal of her adversary as it provides for a stronger justification of her case.
These kinds of interactions are part of the broader field of argumentation, and formal
argumentation is the branch using logic and (formal methods in general) to model it.
Over the past few years a line of research emerged for the representation of these type of
arguments: dialogue games. Dialogue games are proven extremely useful for modelling
some forms of legal reasoning. In this paper we focus on one form of dialogue games,
the adversarial, where the two parties debate over one topic.
Most formal models of dialogues provide computational and procedural representa-
tions of some real-life domain (e.g., legal reasoning). Dialogue games are by their own
nature defeasible, it means that arguments put forward by one of the agents in support
of a conclusion can be defeated by contrary evidence put forward by the other agent.
Accordingly, standard model-theoretic semantics is not appropriate for this kind of rea-
soning. Dung [4] proposed argumentation semantics to obviate this issue. The main
idea of argumentation semantics is that the main objects we evaluate are “arguments”4.
4 In the abstract formulation of the argumentation semantics ‘arguments’ is left unspecified,
however, in the majority of concrete instances of the argumentation framework, arguments
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Various relationships (e.g. attack, rebut and defeat) between arguments are defined by
the semantics, and the relationships are extended to sets of arguments. The key notion
for a set of arguments is the notion of support, that is whether a set of arguments is self-
consistent and provides the base to derive a conclusion. In other words, if it is possible
to prove the conclusion from the rules, facts and assumptions in the set of supporting
arguments. A conclusion is justified, and thus provable, if there is a set of supporting
arguments and all counterarguments are deficient when we consider the arguments in
the set of supporting arguments. Various argumentation semantics have been proposed
to capture different relationships between supporting and opposing set of arguments.
However, in general some forms of argumentation semantics are able to characterise
dialogue games [18].
Defeasible Logic [13,1] is an efficient non-monotonic formalism that encompasses
many logics proposed for legal reasoning. Defeasible Logic can be characterised in
terms of argumentation semantics [5], thus the correspondence between Defeasible
Logic on one side and dialogue games on the other follows implicitly from their com-
mon semantics. The aim of this paper is to propose a direct mapping between dialogue
games and Defeasible Logic, and to show that Defeasible Logic offers a general, pow-
erful and computationally efficient framework to model and to extend dialogue games.
The paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we outline the basic ideas of dia-
logue games, then Section 3 provides an informal introduction to defeasible logic, and
in Section 4 we show how to adapt Defeasible Logic to model dialogue games. We
conclude the paper in Sections 5 and 6 with a discussion of related work and possible
research extensions.
2 On dialogue games
We consider dialogue games as a game where we have two players called the Proponent
and the Opponent. Each player is equipped with a set of arguments, a subset of which
the players move, i.e., take turns in putting forward. The aim of the game is to justify
a particular conclusion while adhering to the particular protocol scheme governing the
game. A basic protocol for the admissible moves by the players be, for the proponent,
that the current move attacks the previous move of the opponent, and that the main claim
(the content of the dispute) follows from the arguments assessed as currently valid. For
the opponent we have that the arguments of the move attack the previous move, and
the main claim is not derivable. Even though more complex winning conditions are
possible, by a basic protocol a player wins the dialogue game when the other party is
out of admissible moves.
3 Basic Defeasible Logic
Over the years Defeasible Logic [13,1] proved to be a simple, flexible, rule based non-
monotonic formalism able to capture different and sometimes incompatible facets of
are defined as a chain of reasoning based on facts or assumptions and rules captured in some
formal language or logic.
non-monotonic reasoning [2], and efficient and powerful implementations have been
proposed [12,8].
Knowledge in Defeasible Logic can be represented in two ways: facts and rules.
Facts are indisputable statements represented by ground literals. For example,
“Tweety is a penguin” is represented by Penguin(Tweety).
A rule, on the other hand, describes the relationship between a set of literals
(premises) and a literal (conclusion), and we can specify how strong the relationship
is. As usual rules allow us to derive new conclusions given a set of premises. We dis-
tinguish between strict rules, defeasible rules and defeaters represented, respectively,
by expressions of the form A1, . . . ,An→ B, A1, . . . ,An⇒ B and A1, . . . ,An; B, where
A1, . . . ,An is a possibly empty set of prerequisites (causes) and B is the conclusion (ef-
fect) of the rule. We only consider rules that are essentially propositional, this means
that rules containing free variables are to be interpreted as rule schemas and the corre-
spond to the set of their ground instances.
Strict rules are rules in the classical sense: whenever the premises are indisputable
then so is the conclusion. Thus they can be used for definitional clauses. An example of
a strict rule is “Penguins are birds”, formally: Penguin(X)→ Bird(X).
Defeasible rules are rules that can be defeated by contrary evidence. An example of
such a rule is “Birds usually fly”: Bird(X)⇒ Fly(X). The idea is that if we know that X
is a bird, then we may conclude that X can fly unless there is other evidence suggesting
that she may not fly.
Defeaters are special kind of rules. They are used to prevent conclusions, not to
support them. For example: Heavy(X); ¬Fly(X). This rule states that if something is
heavy then it might not fly. This rule can prevent the derivation of a “fly” conclusion.
On the other hand it cannot be used to support a “not fly” conclusion.
Defeasible logic (DL) is a “skeptical” non-monotonic logic, meaning that it does
not support contradictory conclusions. Instead DL seeks to resolve conflicts. In cases
where there is some support for concluding A but also support for concluding ¬A, DL
does not conclude either of them (thus the name “skeptical”). If the support for A has
priority over the support for ¬A then A is concluded. No conclusion can be drawn from
conflicting rules in DL unless these rules are prioritised. The superiority relation among
rules is used to define priorities among rules, that is, where one rule may override the
conclusion of another rule. For example, given the defeasible rules
r : Bird(X)⇒ Fly(X) r′ : Penguin(X)⇒¬Fly(X)
which contradict one another, no conclusive decision can be made about whether a
Tweety can fly or not. But if we introduce a superiority relation  with r′  r, then we
can indeed conclude that Tweety cannot fly since it is a penguin.
We now give a short informal presentation of how conclusions are drawn in DL.
A D be a theory in DL (i.e., a collection of facts, rules and a superiority relation). A
conclusion of D is a tagged literal and can have one of the following four forms:
+∆q meaning that q is definitely provable in D (i.e., using only facts and strict rules).
−∆q meaning that we have proved that q is not definitely provable in D.
+∂q meaning that q is defeasibly provable in D.
−∂q meaning that we have proved that q is not defeasibly provable in D.
Strict derivations are obtained by forward chaining of strict rules, while a defeasible
conclusion p can be derived if there is a rule whose conclusion is p, whose prerequisites
(antecedent) have either already been proven or given in the case at hand (i.e., facts),
and any stronger rule whose conclusion is ¬p has prerequisites that fail to be derived.
In other words, a conclusion p is derivable when:
– p is a fact; or
– there is an applicable strict or defeasible rule for p, and either
• all the rules for ¬p are discarded (i.e., are proved to be not applicable) or
• every applicable rule for ¬p is weaker than an applicable strict5 or defeasible
rule for p.
Formally a Defeasible Logic theory (as formalised in [3]) is a structure D = (F,R,>)
where F is a finite set of factual premises, R a finite set of rules, and > a superiority
relation on R. Given a set R of rules, we denote the set of all strict rules in R by Rs, the
set of strict and defeasible rules in R by Rsd , the set of defeasible rules in R by Rd , and
the set of defeaters in R by Rd f t . R[q] denotes the set of rules in R with consequent q.
In the following ∼p denotes the complement of p, that is, ∼p is ¬q if p = q, and ∼p
is q if p is ¬q. For a rule r we will use A(r) to indicate the body or antecedent of the
rule and C(r) for the head or consequent of the rule. A rule r consists of its antecedent
A(r) (written on the left; A(r) may be omitted if it is the empty set) which is a finite set
of literals, an arrow, and its consequent C(r) which is a literal. In writing rules we omit
set notation for antecedents.
Provability is based on the concept of a derivation (or proof) in D. A derivation is a
finite sequence P= (P(1), . . . ,P(n)) of tagged literals. Each tagged literal satisfies some
proof conditions. A proof condition corresponds to the inference rules corresponding
to one of the four kinds of conclusions we have mentioned above. P(1..i) denotes the
initial part of the sequence P of length i. Here we state the conditions for strictly and
defeasibly derivable conclusions (see [1] for the full presentation of the logic):
If P(i+1) = +∆q then
(1) q ∈ F , or
(2) r ∈ Rs[q], ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆a ∈ P(1..i).
If P(i+1) = +∂q then
(1) +∆q ∈ P(1..i), or
(2) (2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd [q]∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.2) −∆∼q ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) :−∂a ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd [q] ∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂a ∈ P(1..i) and t > s.
4 Modelling dialogue games in Defeasible Logic
During the dialogue game the agents take turns in presenting their arguments (rules).
The literal the agents are trying to prove or disprove will be called the critical literal.
5 Note that a strict rule can be defeated only when its antecedent is defeasibly provable.
Each agent has knowledge that initially is known only to the agent (private knowledge).
Initially all the arguments are private. In addition, both agents have access to a set of
common knowledge. By putting forward arguments from the private knowledge of an
agent, these arguments becomes part of the set of common knowledge. We assume that
all arguments (rules) are defeasible, acknowledging an agent’s right to put forward inter-
pretations of assumptions, fact and evidence in the way most favourable for his case (cf.
[9]). The set of common arguments is continuously updated at each step and defeated
defeasible rules are removed at each step. At any time the set of common arguments
contains defeasible rules only from the current step ti and adjacent previous step ti−1
and facts, strict rules from previous steps. The theory of common set of arguments is
Tcommon = (F,R,>), where F is the set of facts, R is the set of rules, > is superiority
relationship among the rules. At each step the proof procedure is applied on the criti-
cal literal. The nature of the game determines the burden as well as the winner of the
game. A party wins the game if the proof is +∆A (A is the critical literal) at any stage
of the game. If a party at any stage of the game proves +∂A (A is the critical literal) the
other party has the burden to produce proof of−∂A, or +∆¬A or +∂¬A. Our notion of
burden is restricted only to the critical literal unlike the notion of burden in [15].
The condition that a agent cannot repeat its rule is unnecessary in our model. If a
rule r has been put forward and successfully defeated any counterarguments supporting
the opposite conclusion ¬C(s) the rule r is added to the common set of knowledge. In
accordance to our protocol the rule r will effectively prevent the opponent from putting
forward the defeated arguments (rules) for ¬C(r) into the dialogue as we require all
admissible arguments to be defeating opposing arguments presented at a previous step.
In addition this criterion guarantees that the dialogue game terminates, since we assume
the private and public set of arguments are finite.
4.1 A protocol
Mainly we adhere to the protocol of a dialogue game captured in [15,16,14,17]. Thus,
the rules for our dialogue games are as follows:
1. The parties cannot present arguments in parallel. Thus, the parties take turn in pre-
senting their arguments.
2. As we allow for each agent to put forward as argument the interpretations of rules
and evidence in the way most favourable for his case, all arguments presented by an
agent are initially treated as defeasible rules. If in next step the other party fails to
provide valid counterarguments, these defeasible rules be upgraded to strict rules.
3. The arguments in support of a critical literal ∼A presented by a party 1 at any
step must attack (at least) the conclusion in support of the critical literal A put
forward by the other party 2 in the previous step. Moreover, in order to prevent a
strengthening of the defeasible rules in support of A in the set of common arguments
and to remove from the set of common arguments all defeasible rules which has as
conclusion A, party 1 must present at least one new argument with its own critical
literal ∼A as its conclusion.
4. An agent cannot attack its own arguments. In our dialogue game framework it is
not admissible for an agent to contradict itself by putting forward rules with a con-
clusion that contradicts a rule previously presented by the agent.
5. A particular dialogue game is won by an agent when the other party at his turn
cannot make an admissible move.
6. A argument r is stronger than an argument s, conflicting with r and played in the
previous time-step, if r is not attacked in successive steps.
4.2 Strengthening of rules
Dialogues are parsed into defeasible theories. The time of a dialogue is translated as
the time of a rule. All the rules presented at the current step ti and at the adjacent
previous step ti−1 are defeasible rules. Here we consider the time as a set of finite
numbers and each number is one unit more or less than its previous or next number.
If not immediately rebutted by the other party, we allow for the rule strength of a rule
to be strengthened from defeasible into strict. A rule is represented as Rtx|x ∈ (d,s,sd)
where t is the time (or the move when the rule has been played), d means the rule is
defeasible, s means the rule is strict, sd means the rule is either strict or defeasible. We
write a@t to denote the literal a being put forward or upgraded at time t. The condition
for upgrading a defeasible rule to a strict rule is described below.
If p is the conclusion of a defeasible rule of the adjacent previous step ti−1, we
upgrade the strength of the rule to strict in next step ti+1 if
∃r ∈ Rt ′d [p], t ′ < t, ∀t ′′ : t ′ < t ′′ < t Rt
′′
sd [∼p] = /0 and ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆a@t
We stipulate that strict rules are stronger than defeasible rules.
∀t,∀r ∈ Rts[q] and ∀s ∈ Rtd [∼q], r >t s
At each step of the game, if an argument (rule) has precedence over any contradictory
defeasible rule of the previous steps, an agent is allowed to put forward that argument.
The strength is determined either by previously known superiority relationships or the
validity of the rule. We assume that if at time t2 we have a valid rule R
t2
2 which contra-
dicts a defeasible rule Rt11 of time t1 and t2 > t1, the strength of R
t2
2 is greater than R
t1
1 .
We will use defeasible logic to determine strength of a new rule.
w >t s iff w > s ∈ (>) or w ∈ Rt ′ [p], s ∈ Rt [∼p] where t ′ < t
4.3 Transition rules
The sets of common arguments construct the theories T1,T2,T3, . . . . Here the subscripts
indicate the time when1 the sets of common arguments are constructed. At time 1, the
game begins and arguments in support of a critical literal A are put forward by the
proponent, then T1 contains only defeasible rules. At time 2, the opponent proposes
new defeasible rules which by the conditions presented in the Section 4.2 are stronger
than some rules in theory T1. The set of common arguments of the first two theories T1
and T2 consists only of defeasible rules. (Theory T2 consists of defeasible rules from
both time 1 and time 2.) Let the first theory T1 = ({},R1d ,>) be created from arguments
(ARG1) of the proponent, and the second theory T2 = ({},R2d ,>) be created through
modifications of T1 by arguments(ARG2) from the opponent. Now the transition rules
from first theory to second theory is
1. If r ∈ R1d and ∀s ∈ ARG2, ¬C(s) 6=C(r)∧¬C(s) /∈ A(r), then r ∈ R2d .
2. All rules of ARG2 are added to T2 as defeasible rule. Here we assume that ARG2
is valid and that a valid argument, by the above defined precedence relations, is
stronger than any contradictory argument of the previous step.
At time n, n> 2 theory Tn is created through modification of Tn−1 by arguments (ARGn)
of the player who has to play at that step. The rules for transition from Tn−1 to Tn are
1. If r ∈ Rn−1s then r ∈ Rns .
2. If r ∈ Rn−2d and ∀s ∈ ARGn−1,¬C(s) 6=C(r)∧¬C(s) /∈ A(r), then r ∈ Rns ; otherwise
r /∈ Rn. Here we should note that the player will not oppose its previous argument.
Thus, all unchallenged rules of time n−2 are upgraded as strict rules at time n.
3. If r ∈ Rn−1d and ∀s ∈ ARGn−1,¬C(s) 6=C(r)∧¬C(s) /∈ A(r), then r ∈ Rnd . All un-
challenged defeasible rules of time n−1 are added to Tn as defeasible rules at time
n.
4. All rules of ARGn−1 are added to Tn as defeasible rules. Here we assume that
ARGn−1 is valid and that a valid argument, by the above defined precedence re-
lations, is stronger than any contradictory argument of previous step.
It is to be noted that in the first two theories only proof of +∂A or −∆A of a literal A
could result. Thus, this framework needs at least three steps in order to determine a win-
ner of a particular game. When the first party cannot produce defeasible rules that will
defeat contradictory defeasible rules presented by the second party at the previous step,
the undefeated defeasible rules of the second party will be strengthened into strict rules.
This allows the second party to support its argument and hence prove the critical literal
definitely. Let theory Ti be created through modification of theory Ti−1 by argument
(ARGi) of player 1 and the critical literal A is defeasibly proven +∂A in this theory. Let
at time i+1, player 2 cannot produce any arguments defeating the arguments of player
1, then player 1 wins at time i+2 as the proof as +∂A by the strengthening of the rules
from defeasible into strict will result in the proof +∆A at time i+2.
4.4 An example
Now we will illustrate the model of the dialogue game defeasible logic we have pro-
posed with the help of an example. Consider an argumentation game with two players,
Alice and Bob. Agent Alice is trying to prove A and agent Bob is trying to prove ¬A. At
each step of the dialogue game they maintain a current set of rules CRt , where t is the
time. A rule in CRt , will be represented as R′i@t and the corresponding rule present in
agent’s private knowledge will be represented as Ri. Let at time t1 the game starts and
Alice makes the first move as
R1 : /0⇒ B, R2 : B⇒ A.
This will generate two defeasible rule as
R′1( /0⇒ B)@t1, R′2(B⇒ A)@t1
and these rules will be inserted into CRt1 . Thus at time t1 we have a proof of +∂A@t1.
But at time t2, Bob presents new evidence in order to disprove A. At time t2 (t2 > t1),
Bob presents the following argument,
R3 : /0⇒ D, R4 : D⇒¬A.
This will generate two new defeasible rules
R′3( /0⇒ D)@t2, R′4(D⇒¬A)@t2.
Now, Bob only attacks R′2 presented by Alice at previous step by R
′
4. Note that as t2 > t1,
R′4 is stronger than R
′
2. At time t2, R
′
1 remains unchallenged and it will remain in CRt2
with a changed time stamp as R′1( /0⇒ B)@t2. The proof at time t2 is +∂¬A. At time t3,
Alice presents the following arguments to prove A,
R5 : B⇒¬D, R6 : /0⇒ E and R7 : E⇒ A.
So the translated defeasible rules are
R′5(B⇒¬D)@t3, R′6( /0⇒ E)@t3, R′7(E⇒ A)@t3.
Now R′3 is defeated by R′5 which then makes R
′4 not applicable. Again the time stamp
of R′1 will be changed and as this rule was unchallenged by Bob at t2 and its strength will
increase as R′1( /0→ B)@t3. So the proof at time t3 is +∂A. If Bob does not present valid
arguments in the next step, Alice wins the game as we allow an agent to upgrade the
strength of unchallenged rules in the next time t4. At t4 Alice can upgrade the defeasible
rules supporting the proof of +∂A into strict rules and subsequently prove +∆A.
4.5 Reconsideration and strategy
In our argumentation framework, as in dialogue games in general, reconsideration is
not possible as rules are either carried to next step as strict rules or facts, or they are
defeated. If the rule is defeated, the agent can no longer argue based on this previous
decision. Also, if the status of the rule is strengthened it cannot be defeated any longer.
In addition no agent can put forward arguments conflicting with the argument she put
forward in previous steps. This means that an agent cannot withdrawn an argument that
is used by her opponent to support the opponent critical claim. Notice that in a step an
agent can have more than one set of suitable arguments. Here we present some intuitions
on how to efficiently distinguish between these choices.
An agent can argue with additional information even if it is not related with the
current argument in order to block opponents future arguments at an early stage. For
example, if at t1, Alice presents two arguments as R1 : A⇒ B and R2 :⇒¬D, which is
defended by Bob at t2 by R3 : C⇒¬B, thus R2 is strengthened into a fact at t3. Now at
t3, Alice passes argument R4 : E⇒ B. Thus, at t4 Bob has only one argument to defend
as R5 : D⇒¬B. Bob cannot put forward argument R5 as R2 is a fact and stronger than
R5. Hence Alice wins. This will save one step as if Alice had not passed R2 at t1, Bob
will present R4 at t4 and it has to play R2 at t5.
5 Related work
Modelling dialogue games in defeasible logic has been addressed by [10,9,11], and
the present paper builds on some ideas of [10,9]. [11] focuses on persuasion dialogues
and it includes in the process cognitive states of agents such as knowledge and beliefs.
In addition it presents some protocols for some types of dialogues (e.g., information
seeking, explanation, persuasion). The main reasoning mechanism is based on basic
defeasible logic (see Section 3) and it ignores recent development in extensions of de-
feasible logic with modal and epistemic operators for representing the cognitive states
of agents [6,7], and it does not cover adversarial dialogues. [10] provides an extension
of defeasible logic to include the step of the dialogue in a very similar to what we have
presented in the paper. A main difference is that the resulting mechanism just defines
a metaprogram for an alternative computation algorithm for ambiguity propagating de-
feasible logic while the logic presented here is ambiguity blocking. In [9], the authors
focus on rule scepticism and proposes to use a sequences of defeasible (meta) theories,
and use meta-reasoning (meta-rules or high level rules) to assess the strength of rules
for the theories at lower levels.
Inference System (IS) was proposed in [15] to capture dialogue games. A theory in
IS is represented by TIS = (R,≤) where R is set of strict and defeasible rules and ≤ is a
partial preorder which resolves any conflicts on precedence between rules. Arguments
are justified, overruled and defensible depending on the outcome of the dialogue game.
[16] describes the burdens associated with IS. According to [16], there are three kinds
of burden as (1) Burden of persuasion (2) Burden of production and (3) Tactical Burden
of proof. In [15], players have fixed roles as the burden of prosecution lies on the propo-
nent, leaving the opponent with the burden to interfere. [14] modified IS as it proposes
switching of roles in Litigation inference system (LIS). A theory in LIS is represented
as TLIS = (R,≤,bpi ,bδ ) where (R,≤) is an IS theory. bpi ,bδ are burden of prosecution
for proponent and opponent respectively. [17] modifies LIS and proposes Augmented
Litigation inference system (ALIS) which generates the content of bpi ,bδ as a result
of an argument-based reasoning. A theory in ALIS is represented as TALIS = (R,≤),
where (R,≤) is an IS theory described by a language which has a predicate burden.
burden(p, l) means that on the player p is placed the burden of prosecution for the lit-
eral l. A dialogue move m has three components: (1) pl(m), the player who made the
move (2) r(m), the role of the player, and (3) a(m) the argument put forward in the
move. ALIS imposes a protocol to be followed by the players. The protocol in ALIS
differs from the protocol proposed in LIS in the sense that (1) if in the adjacent previous
step the opponent weakly defeated an argument proposed by the proponent, then in the
current step the proponent can argue that the opponent now has a burden on that literal;
and (2) If the players weakly defeat each other while in their opponent role, then the
plaintiff can argue that defendant has the burden of proof.
6 Conclusion and future work
We have presented a dialogue game framework in defeasible logic. We have shown that
strength of an unchallenged rule can be upgraded in a dialogue game. We plan to ex-
tend the framework to cover more types of dialogue games and to model the different
types of burden of proof. We also intend to study cost functions related of to dialogue
games and investigate how a strategy can be developed with the aim of maximising the
payoff of the game [19]. In addition, this framework could be extended to model the
behaviour of an agent ϕ in a dynamic environment ε . By representing the environment
as one of the parties, the agent ϕ is enabled, by putting forward arguments, to reason
on its environment in a both reactive and a proactive way. This would allow for a nat-
ural characterisation of the environment as the uncertainty in the environment can be
modelled as the private knowledge of ε .
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